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Nicholson: The Trend--To Balance the Injuries

NOTES
THE TREND-TO BALANCE THE INJURIES
INTRODUCTION

To propose that equity should balance the conveniences, in
considering the advisability of an injunction to abate a nuisance, seems to instinctively cause many who are only generally familiar with this equitable doctrine to shrink in horror,
and answer, no-the court cannot concern itself with conveniences. But to speak of the relative hardship which would result from the issuance or denial of the injunction, or even to
suggest a balancing of the equities, causes less consternation.
Whatever be its descriptive terminology,' there has developed in equity the principle that the court can and ought
to refuse an injunction where to grant it would cause an injury out of all proportion to the injury to the plaintiff by the
nuisance which he seeks to enjoin. The equity courts of some
jurisdictions deny the existence of their power to balance
the conveniences or equities to refuse an injunction on such
grounds, while others apply this principle to its fullest extent.
It is beyond the scope of this note to attempt any analytical
treatment of the development of the doctrine, other than to
show some of the features of, and reasons for, its application.
Some indication will be given as to the present status of the
doctrine, with especial attention to its status in South Carolina, and its possible application by the South Carolina courts
in the future.
The doctrine here under study has been employed in three
principal types of cases: suits to enjoin continuing trespasses, 2 stream pollution, 3 and to abate nuisances, both pub1. The phrase "balance of convenience" has been justly termed a misSee RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 941, comment a; MCCLINTOCK, Discretion to Deny Injunction Against Trespass and Nuisance, 12 MINN. L.
nomer.

REv. 565, 569 (1928); 29 MIcH. L. REv. 516 (1931).
2. McElroy v. Kansas City, 21 Fed. 257 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1884);
Lynch v. Union Institution for Savings, 159 Mass 306, 34 N. E. 364
(1893); 5 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1922 (4th ed. 1919); 31

YALE L. J. 330 (1922).
3. Monroe Carp Pond Co. v. River Raisin Paper Co., 240 Mich. 279,
215 N. W. 325 (1927); Driscoll v. American Hide and Leather Co., 102
Misc. 612, 710 N. Y. S. 121 (1918), aff'd 184 App. Div. 916; see JACOBSON, Stream Pollution and Special Interests, 8 Wis. L. REV. 99, 113
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lie and private. The approach to the doctrine being substantially the same in all three situations, no distinction will be
hereafter made between them, and the nuisance cases (being
by far the most numerous) will be considered typical.
WHERE COURTS MUST BALANCE

Before approaching the problem in its essential form, several situations should be noted in which the courts do clearly
and of necessity balance the injuries. Upon application for
preliminary injunctions the courts must consider the possibilities of injury and refuse such relief if the hardship
which would result to the defendant from the issuance of
such an injunction greatly exceeds the benefit the injunction
would bestow upon the complainant or any hardship caused
to him by the denial of the relief.4 Some such utilization of
a comparative injury doctrine has also been made in considering mandatory injunctions, both interlocutory 5 and permanent. 6
Further, it is generally recognized that in cases where the
nuisance complained of causes no direct injury to the plaintiff-constitutes "no invasion of a clearly defined right of the
plaintiff" 7-but is rather a nuisance only under the particular
circumstances present (e.g., noise, vibration, pollution of air),
then, in determining the existence of a nuisance, the court
should employ some sort of balancing of injury to determine
whether the alleged nuisance warrants injunctive relief.$ In
addition to the degree and extent of injury and other circumstantial elements present, the locality in question (i.e.,
whether a predominantly industrial area) is utilized as one
of the considerations in determining whether a nuisance actually exists. 9 Quite accurately, a commentator on this sub(1932); note, 60 U. Or PA. L. REv. 665 (1912); notes, 46 A. L. R. 60;

106 A. L. R. 692, 696.
4. Kennerty v. Etiwan Phosphate Co., 17 S. C. 411, 417 (1881); Benton v. Kernan, 126 N. J. Eq. 343, 8 A. 2d 719 (1939); 5 PoMERoY, EQ.
JuR. § 1944.
5. Herbert v. Penn. R. R. Co., 43 N. J. Eq. 21, 10 A. 872 (1887);
CLARK, EQUITY 276 (1919); note, 15 A. L. R. 2d 250.

6. Forest Land Co. v. Black, 216 S. C. 255, 266, 57 S. E. 2d
(1950).
7. 5 PomEROY, op. cit. supra note 4, at 4414.
8. Parker v. Winnipisiogie Lake Cotton & Woolen Co., 2 Black
(U. S. 1863); Demarest v. Hardham, 34 N. J. Eq. 469 (1881).
9. Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich. 448 (1871); Riedeman v.
Morris Electric Light Co., 56 App. Div. 23, 67 N. Y. S. 391 (1900);
notes, 31 L. R. A. (N. s.) 894; 61 A. L. R. 931.
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ject has noted that when applied for this purpose, the doctrine
of balancing injuries has seldom been mentioned by name, 10
for the courts have unconsciously applied the principle in
properly considering the purported nuisance in the light of
the relevant circumstances. The result of the court's finding
that no nuisance exists is, of course, a bar to any relief, both
injunctive and at law.
It should also be noted that where the defendant's conduct
has been malicious and not innocent the courts have properly
rejected his invocation of the comparative injury doctrine.'
WHERE CONFLICT ENTERS

The essential problem, in regard to balancing the injuries,
arises when the court, having determined the existence of a
nuisance, is confronted with the realization that the issuance
of an injunction would bring about a harsh and undersirable
result. Is the court justified in refusing injunctive relief and
remitting the plaintiff to an action at law for damages because of the gross nature of the resultant injury to the defendant, and perhaps thereby to the public?
The cases considering this question result, as has been
noted, in a decided split among the courts, 12 and even among

the text-writers and other authorities there is difference of
opinion as to what is the prevailing view." To further complicate the matter, there is variance among decisions within
4
single jurisdictions.
10. Note, 25 VA. L. REv. 465, 471 (1939). This writer criticized the
use of the doctrine in determining the existence of a nuisance "as the
rankest discrimination against small property owners". It is of significance, however, that Mr. Pomeroy, who otherwise strongly objects to
the doctrine, spoke of its application in this sort of case as "an essential
factor in the decision whether any nuisance exists or not". Note 7, supra.
11. Kershishian v. Johnson, 210 Mass. 135, 96 N. E. 56 (1911);
Stowers v. Gilbert, 156 N. Y. 600, 51 N. E. 282 (1898). This consideration has, of course, appeared in the cases dealing with continued trespasses, as a nuisance rarely involves the element of wilfullness. But cf.,
Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 262, 215 P. 534 (1923).
12. It would be impractical to attempt any listing of cases employing
the doctrine and those rejecting it. See note, 61 A. L. R. 924; 28 AM. JUR.
250; 43 C. J. S. 465; Comment, 37 YALE L. J. 96, n. 3 on p. 97 (1927).
13. The earlier authorities considered the weight to be opposed to
balancing. 5 POMEROY, EQ. JUR. § 1944 at 4416; CLARK, EQuITy 279;
note, 61 A. L. R. 927. But more recent commentaries present some doubt
as to that position today. 31 Tax. Ju. 448, quoted in Storey v. Central
Hide and Rendering Co., 148 Tex. 509, 226 S. W. 2d 615, 619 (1950) as
follows: "Some decisions ignore the balance of injury doctrine .

.

. But

these cases do not represent ihe weight of authority".
14. See Comment, 37 YALE L. J. 96, n. 4 on p. 97 (1927).
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The theoretical crux of the conflict lies in the more basic
problem of whether an injunction is a matter of right or of
grace. The weight of authority has been attributed to the view
that where there exists a nuisance causing substantial and irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remedy at
law, then the injured party is entitled, as a matter of right,
to injunctive relief. 15 On the other hand, it has been repeatedly
held that an application for an injunction appeals to the conscience of the court, and that the right to such relief is not absolute. 16 It is submitted, however, that this theoretical problem
is of no practical importance in approaching the realities of
nuisance cases, for the courts seem to adopt the cloak of the
chameleon, saying, when they wish to balance the injuries,
that an injunction is a matter of grace, and holding, when
they wish to refute any application of the doctrine, that this
grace becomes a matter of right when it is clear that the law
can give no relief.'7
FACTORS

To BE CONSIDERED

Any attempt to make an analytical survey of the cases professing to balance the injuries results in almost hopeless, but
justifiable, confusion. The reason for this inability to group
or reconcile the cases is apparent. While the fundamental issues are the same, the many varying factors involved necessitate the consideration, in each decision, of its complete factual background.
The disproportion between the respective injuries is, of
course, the determinative factor in each of the cases where the
court has undertaken to balance the injuries. Other factors,
such as amount of the injury, laches, attempted extortion,
15. American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Godfrey, 158 Fed. 225 (8th Cir.

1907); Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540, 57 A. 1065

(1904); see note, 61 A. L. R. 927.
16. Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 230 U. S. 46 (1913); Mountain
Copper Co. v. U. S., 142 Fed. 625 (9th Cir. 1906); Elliott Nursery Co.

v. Duquesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 A. 345 (1924).
17. See MCCLINTOCK, 12 MINN. L. Rnv. 565 (1928); 23 MiCH. L. REV.
406 (1925). This proposition is aptly illustrated by the experience of
the Pennsylvania courts, who first broadly affirmed equity's discretion
to grant or deny injunctions-Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105, 98 Am. Dec.
202 (1868); Huckenstine's Appeal, 70 Pa. 102, 10 Am. Rep. 669 (1871),
then changed their attitude and declared that an injunction was a matter
of right-Walters v. McElroy, 151 Pa. 549, 25 A. 125 (1892) ; Sullivan
v. Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540, 57 A. 1065 (1904), and finally reverted to
their original position-Elliott Nursery Co. v. Duquesne Light Co.,
supra note 16.
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effect of an injunction on the defendant, and effect on the public, may be present in varying degrees and are often inextricably mixed.
Technically, a distinction must be made between applying
the doctrine of comparative injury to cases of material and
substantial injury to the plaintiff, and those involving slight
or trifling injury' 8 (meaning inherently slight or trifling and
not comparatively so).19 An injunction is normally refused
where the injury to the plaintiff is slight, not by a comparison
of injuries, but on the theory that equity will not redress a
technical, as distinguished from a material, wrong, where
the relief sought is oppressive. 20 Nevertheless, the cases
speak of a comparison of injuries, though the injury to the
plaintiff could be classed as slight, 2' and thus the extent of
injury remains a factor to be considered.
Any element of laches on the part of the plaintiff or acquiescence by him in the defendant's conduct has been given
consideration by the courts, 22 such element tending to afford
more reason to balance the injuries in the defendant's favor.
While the fact that the plaintiff "came to the nuisance" will
not necessarily defeat his right to relief, yet if there has been
any indication that the plaintiff bought his land with the purpose of compelling the defendant to purchase it at an exorbi23
tant price, the courts have refused injunctive relief.
Although it has been stated that, by the weight of authority,
convenience to the general public affords no basis for the application of the doctrine of balancing the injuries, 24 that position is open to question today (as will be pointed out in the
discussion of recent cases). The effect on the public, particularly on employees of the defendant and the inhabitants of
the region in which the offending plant is situated, has been
18. See note, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 881; 20 MIcH. L. Rnv. 799, 801 (1922).
19. Whalen v. Union Bag and Paper Co., 208 N. Y. 1, 101 N. E. 805
(1913); Behrens v. Richards, 2 Ch. 614 (1905); see note, 61 A. L. R.
931.
20. Bentley v. Empire Portland Cement Co., 48 Misc. 457, 96 N. Y. S.
831 (1905) ; McCann v. Chasm Power Co., 211 N. Y. 301, 105 N. E. 416
(1914).
21. Mountain Copper Co. v. U. S., 142 Fed. 625 (9th Cir. 1906); MacDonald v. Perry, 32 Ariz. 39, 255 P. 494 (1927).
22. McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Min. Co., 140 Fed. 951 (C. C. D.
Utah 1904) ; Herr v. Central Kentucky Lunatic Asylum, 110 Ky. 282, 61
S. W. 283 (1901).
23. Edwards v. Allouez Mining Co., 38 Mich. 46 (1878); Smith v.
Staso Milling Co., 18 Fed. 2d 736 (2nd Cir. 1927).
24. See note, 61 A. L. R. 933, citing as authority State ex rel. Lyon
v. Columbia Water Power Co., 82 S. C. 181, 63 S. E. 884 (1909).
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stressed, 25 and it appears that generally the public interest
or the necessity of the defendant's enterprise to the public
26
will be considered.
The result of the- consideration of these various elements
is that no particular nuisance case wherein the doctrine of
comparative injury was considered applicable can be said to
be a precedent for another, and slightly different, case. Thus,
the reason for confusion is evident. It has been said that many
cases professing to balance the injuries can be explained on
the ground of laches or bad faith on the part of the plaintiff, or
on the ground of some other equitable feature present. 27 This is
quite true, but not in the sense that the courts were in any
way mistaken in balancing the injuries after uncovering
the equitable feature. Rather, the equitable feature present
"opened the door", so to speak, for balancing, and provided
28
the basis for reaching the proper result.

THE MODERN VIEW

The above-stated propositions are well supported by the
more recent cases invoking the comparative injury doctrine.
In Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., the U. S. Supreme
Court delivered a direct decision on a situation involving public interest, and commented on the situation where only private interests are concerned. Speaking for the Court, Justice
Brandeis wrote:
S. . an injunction is not a remedy which issues as a
matter of course. Where substantial redress can be afforded by the payment of money and issuance of the injunction would subject the defendant to grossly disproportionate hardship, equitable relief may be denied
although the nuisance is indisputable. This is true even
if the conflict is between interests which are primarily
private. ...

Where an important public interest would

25. McCarthy v. Bunker Hill Mining Co., 147 Fed. 981 (C. C. D. Idaho

1906), aff'd 164 Fed. 927 (9th Cir. 1908); Bliss v. Anaconda Copper Co.,
167 Fed. 342 (C. C. D. Mont. 1909), aff'd 186 Fed. 789 (9th Cir. 1911).
26. Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U. S. 334 (1933);
Schwarzenbach v. Oneonta Light and Power Co., 144 App. Div. 884, 129
N. Y. S. 384 (1911); see 43 C. J. S. 465.

27. See 9 CoNN. L. Q. 63, 65 (1923).
28. See Hughes v. Jones, ...... Tex .......
29. 289 U. S. 334 (1933).

,

94 S. W. 2d 534, 536 (1936).
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be prejudiced, the reasons for denying the injunction may
be compelling.3 0
In this case, the lower court's decree of injunction against
the defendant city's sewer was reversed, it appearing that
the injunction would cause an expenditure to the defendant
of some $30,000, whereas the property damage to the plaintiff's farm was only about $100 a year.
A more recent New York case involved a situation where
purely private interests were concerned. In an action to enjoin the operation of bowling alleys as a nuisance, injunction
was denied, the court saying:
• . . injunction does not necessarily follow in all cases
where a nuisance exists. The equities of the parties must
be considered, and when the business complained of is
lawful... the primary question is one of relative rights.3 1
Here, the injury to the plaintiff being comparatively slight,
the court, in the final analysis, held that no nuisance existed.
The foregoing two cases present the two extremes-injury
to a direct public concern, and injury solely to private interests. A 1950 Texas decision, Storey v. Central Hide & Refining Co., 32 deals with the more normal situation-a disproportionate direct injury to the defendant and indirect injury to the public. In this case, the facts alleged by the plaintiff as showing defendant's rendering plant to constitute a
nuisance were, by determination of a jury, found in the plaintiff's favor. Nevertheless, the court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that he was thus entitled to an injunction, which
he had obtained, as a matter or right, saying that there should
have been a balancing of the equities to determine if an injunction should have been granted. The evidence offered by
the defendant, but rejected by the trial court, showed that
the plant was in an industrial area, that the offenses complained of (odor and attraction of flies) were of intermittent occurrence, and that there was some element of acquiescence by the plaintiffs. Further, that while the defendant
could move its plant for some $30,000, the practical effect of
the injunction would be to put defendant out of business, that
the defendant was employing the best known scientific prac30. Id. at 338. (Emphasis supplied).

31. Canfield v. Quayle, 170 Misc. 621, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 781, 793 (1939).
32. 148 Tex. 509, 226 S. W. 2d 615 (1950).
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tices to keep down odor and flies, and that the plant served
the needs of about 75,000 people in the community.
Again, in Haack v. Lindsay Light and Chemical Co.,33 the
existence of a nuisance was established by the verdict of a
jury, but again the court rejected the complainant's argument that an injunction should follow as a matter of course,
saying:
That any injunction should be entered as a matter of
course, runs counter to the fundamental principles of
equity, since it is the first duty of all courts of equity to
34
consider the equities of any case before them.
Other recent decisions continue in the same vein: effort to
enjoin construction of an airport, denied; 35 to abate a nuisance arising from operation of sewer of a public school, also
denied. 36
But this is not to suggest that the variance of opinion earlier referred to no longer exists. The courts of New Jersey
adhere to their refusal to consider the doctrine of balance
of injuries, 7 and among others, Minnesota38 and West Virginia. 9
The foregoing treatment of the more recent decisions cannot, of course, be considered exhaustive; but it is submitted
that there is an apparent trend to balance the injuries, 40 evidenced by the American Law Institute's adoption of the view
that relative hardship is a factor to be considered in such
cases. 41 And the cases discussed indicate an increasing adherence to several theories: to deny the existence of a nuisance
where the injury to the plaintiff is slight and defendant has
taken all measures possible to prevent such injury ;42 to seize
on any equitable feature present, such as laches or acquies33.
34.
35.
36.

393 Ill.
367, 66 N. E. 2d 391 (1946).
Id. at 392.
Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N. E. 2d 752 (1947).
Johnson v. Independent School Dist. No. I, 239 Mo. App. 749, 199

S. W. 2d 421 (1947).

37. Benton v. Kernan, 127 N. J. Eq. 434, 13 A. 2d 825 (1940); Sexton
v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 5 N. J. Super. 555, 68 A. 2d
648 (1949).
38. Herrmann v. Larson, 214 Minn. 46, 7 N. W. 2d 330 (1943).

39. Ritz v. Woman's Club, 114 W. Va. 675, 173 S. E. 564 (1934).

40. See 22 ILL. L. REv. 775 (1928).
41. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 941.
42. Notes 31 and 35 supra; Heppenstall v. Berkshire Chemical Co.,
130 Conn. 485, 35 A. 2d 845 (1944) ; Wojnar v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.,
348 Pa. 595, 36 A. 2d 321 (1944).
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cence by the plaintiff, as a basis for balancing the injuries;43
and a growing recognition of a social ingredient in the com44
position of property rights.
SOUTH CAROLINA'S REFUSAL TO BALANCE

The attitude of the South Carolina Supreme Court toward
the comparative injury doctrine is aptly illustrated by a terse
in the 1948 decision of Davis v. Palmetto Quarries
comment
Co.4 5 There, in an action to abate a nuisance consisting of
vibration of earth, throwing of dirt on plaintiff's land, dust
and noise, the lower court had stricken from the defendant's
answer the following:
Defendant has by reason thereof for years past and at
the present time has a large investment in said property
in order that it may carry on a lawful and productive
industry which is not only beneficial to the defendant
but to the community in which it is located.
In affirming on this point, the court said:
The court was influenced to strike the quoted allegations because of their apparent purpose to raise the irrelevant question of balance of convenience and advan46
tage, and we agree.
The foundation for this attitude was laid early 47 and rigidly
adhered to. The noted case of State v. Columbia Water Power
Co.,48 affords some indication of a reluctance to balance the
injuries, although it cannot be said that the question was
there squarely presented to the court. In this petition in the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the complainant
sought to restrain the defendants (including the city of Columbia) from building a bridge across the Columbia Canal,
thereby obstructing a navigable water of the state. In holding
that the State was entitled to an injunction, as the obstruction of the canal would be a permanent nuisance, continued
43. Notes 28 and 32 supra.
44. Note 35 supra.
45. 212 S. C. 496, 48 S. E. 2d 329 (1948).
46. Id. at 500, 48 S. E. 2d at 331. (Emphasis supplied).
47. "The power of this court can rarely be exercised with more salutary effect than in protecting the rights of the humble citizen against
the strong arm of a powerful corporation".-Bird v. W. & M. Ry., 8 Rich.
Eq. 46, 55 (S. C. 1855).
48. 82 S. C. 181, 63 S. E. 884 (1908).
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injury to a property right, and an interference with the valuable right of free navigation, the court said:
The right of the State and the proposed violation by
the defendants of that right being perfectly clear, the
court cannot refuse to enforce the State's right by enjoining the defendants' proposed obstruction on the
ground that the right of navigation of the Columbia
Canal may be of small value in comparison with the great
value to the city of Columbia of the obstruction it proposes to erect. The court's discretion is not broad enough
to permit it to refuse to protect either private or public
property or rights, because the invasion of such property
or the violation of such right would be of benefit to an
49
individual or to a portion of the public.
However, recognizing some duty "to protect, as far as possible, the welfare and health of the city of Columbia", the
court found it necessary to delay final order until a master
could determine whether an immediate injunction would so
seriously interfere with the city's water supply as to endanger
the health of its citizens, and if so, what length of time should
be allowed the city to provide another method of securing
water. 50
Two factors apparently weaken this decision as authority
for the proposition that South Carolina has refused to balance the injuries. First, it did not definitely appear that the
proposed obstruction to be built by the defendants was the
only feasible way of securing water. With this in mind, and
considering the possibilities of harm to the residents of the
city, the court refused to immediately enjoin the defendants.
Secondly, the principal thesis of the court in considering the
proposed bridge to be objectionable was the obstruction of a
navigable water. Thus, it was public interest on the part of
the State, against a still-contingent public concern of the
citizens in their water supply. This is not the usual situation
where an application of the comparative injury doctrine is
proposed.

49. Id. at 194, 63 S. E. at 890. (Emphasis supplied).
50. Id. at 195, 63 S. E. at 890. Permanent injunction was decreed in
85 S. C. 113, 68 S. E. 1118 (1909). For interesting further development

in the case, see 90 S. C. 568, 74 S. E. 26 (1911).
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A few years later, in Williams v. Haile Gold Mining Co.,51
the proposition was again presented, in a more direct manner.
Here, by verdict of a jury, the acts of the defendant were held
to constitute a nuisance, and it was proved that the refuse
matter from defendant's mills had so destroyed the vegetation on plaintiff's land that no cultivation of the lands so affected had been possible for nearly ten years. In affirming the
grant of an injunction, the court first stated that "when the
existence of a nuisance has been established by the verdict
of a jury, the party injured is entitled, as a matter of right,
to an injunction to prevent its continuance", 52 and continued:
Whatever may be the doctrine in other states, under
the provisions of the Constitution of this State, that private property shall not be taken for private use without
the consent of the owner, the court could not have considered, in deciding whether to grant or refuse the injunction, the question raised by the defendant as to the
balance of convenience, or of advantage or disadvantage
to the plaintiff and defendant and the public at large, for
the defendant's use of the stream. That question would
be pertinent only in an application addressed to the Legislature to give such corporations the power of condemnation.53
This quotation shows the reliance of the court upon the
State's constitutional provision that private property shall not
be taken for a private use.5 4 Such reliance appears to have
been warranted in the Williams case because the injury to the
plaintiff's land did amount to a physical deprivation of any
use of the land. It can only be questioned whether the court
would likewise rely upon that provision in a case involving
a nuisance of less pernicious qualities, one in which the plaintiff was subjected to only a theoretical "taking" of his land.
At least one theory of the Williams case has been repudiated
by modern decisions representing the trend to balance-that
the establishment of a nuisance by the verdict of a jury entitles the plaintiff to an injunction as a matter of right.65
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

85 S. C. 1, 66 S. E. 117 (1909).
Id. at 6, 66 S. E. at 118.
Id. at 7, 66 S. E. at 118.
S. C. Const. Art. I, § 17.
Notes 32 and 33, supra.
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SOCIAL ENGINEERING

In answer to objections that to refuse an injunction on
the balance of hardships and compel the injured party to seek
damages is to take his property for a private purpose,66 and
to deprive the poor man of his property to give it to those who
are already rich, 57 the courts are today replying with a denand for recognition of a change in public policy and are
speaking of a "wise social engineering". For example, the
following was quoted with approval in Storey v. Central Hide
& Rendering Co., 68 a case analyzed earlier:
Some one must suffer these inconveniences rather than
that the public interest should suffer ....

These conflict-

ing interests call for a solution of the question by the
application of the broad principles of right and justice,
leaving the individual to his remedy by compensation
and maintaining the public interests intact; this works
hardships on the individual, but they are incident to civilization with its physical developments ...

9

Again, in Antonik v. Chamberlain:60
All systems of jurisprudence recognize the requirement
of compromises in the social state.... Undoubtedly the

plaintiffs will experience some discomfort, but that is
one of the incidents or results of residing in a heavilypopulated, highly industrialized state. It is an incident of
living in an age of progress, in which ...

thousands of

various industries throughout the cities and countryside
contaminate and defile the former natural beauty, peacefulness and quiet of the vicinage.
These expressions come from cases where there would have
been a definite injury to the public if an injunction were
granted, and they represent the more advanced treatment of
such situations. It is of course difficult to employ such reason56. 5 POMEROY, EQ. JuR § 1944 (4th ed. 1919); 13 COL. L. Ray. 635,
and cases cited. This objection refuted in RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939)
§ 941, comment d; and in article by MCCLINTOCK, 12 MINN. L. REv. 565,
572 (1928).
57. Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 12 Ariz. 190, 100 P. 405 (1909);
Whalen v. Union Bag Co., 208 N. Y. 1, 101 N. E. 805 (1913).
58. 148 Tex. 509, 515, 226 S. W. 2d 615, 619 (1950).

59. 31 Tax. Jua.448.

60. 81 Ohio App. 465, 477-478, 78 N. E. 2d 752, 759-760 (1947).
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ing in cases where the injury is to the defendant alone, and
it is not so clear that an attempt to balance the injuries should
be made in such cases.6 ' It is submitted, however, that few
such cases arise today.
CONCLUSION

It has been accurately proposed that the misleading character of the term "balance of conveniences", 62 by which the
comparative injury doctrine is commonly known, has induced
many courts, when dealing with cases not in themselves involving strong equities, to hold that the doctrine is not a
permissible defense.63 A more firm foundation for the utilization of the doctrine is accorded by such treatment as the following:
. . . it (the doctrine of balance of conveniences) is an
equitable one and is merely a statement of a phase of
the proposition that all the circumstances will be taken
into consideration, including the damages to the respective parties, in granting or withholding the discretionary
64
writ of injunction.
Thus considering the doctrine in its true sense, it becomes
less difficult to stomach, and even more, it appears to be well
grounded in reason and logic.
FRANCIS NICHOLSON

61. See MCCLINTOCK, 12 MINN. L. REv. 565, 573 (1928).

62. See note 1, supra.
63. See 29 MicH. L. REv. 516 (1931).
64. Stock and Sons v. Litchfield Co-op. Shipper's Ass'n, 251 Mich. 461,
232 N. W. 395, 396 (1930).
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